Abstract : This article develops a framework for addressing racial ontologies in transnational perspective. In contrast to simple contextualist accounts, it is argued that a globally engaged metaphysics of race needs to address transnational continuities of racial ontologies. In contrast to unificationist accounts that aim for one globally unified ontology, it is argued that questions about the nature and reality of race do not always have the same answers across national contexts. In order address racial ontologies in global perspective, the article develops a framework that accounts for both continuities and discontinuities by looking beyond the referents of narrowly defined core concepts. By shifting the focus from narrow concepts to richer conceptions of race, racial ontologies become comparable through globally related but nonetheless distinct mappings between conceptions and property relations. The article concludes by showing how this framework can generate novel insights in case studies from Asia, Europe, and Latin America.
Introduction
W.E.B. Du Bois' 1952 lecture "The Negro and the Warsaw Ghetto" develops an autobiographical perspective on the challenges of thinking about race across borders. Reflecting on his time at the University of Berlin in 1893-1894, Du Bois remarks that "race problems at the time were to me purely problems of color, and principally slavery in the United States and near slavery in Africa" (1971, 250) . And indeed, this focus is clearly reflected in Du Bois' most influential works including his famous claim that "the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line" (2007, xiv) . In his address to the Jewish Life Tribute to the Warsaw Ghetto Fighters , however, Du Bois reflects on his encounter with a broader "race problem
[that] cut across lines of color and physique [...] and was a matter of cultural patterns, perverted teaching and human hate and prejudice, which reached all sorts of people" 1 Addressing ontologies of race through conceptions and property relations is not supposed to presuppose racial realism. For example, the framework builds on an analysis of race conceptions that often involve false racialist assumptions and therefore do not fully map onto existing property relations. Furthermore, I use the example of post-Holocaust Germany to argue that at least some racial ontologies emphasize these racialist dimensions so strongly that realist interpretations become implausible. 2 There is a political problem with this line of argument that I am not going to explore further but that is illustrated by the lack of extensive debates about Indonesian or Sudanese (or really any non-Anglophone) ontologies of race in major philosophy journals: A simple contextualist division of labor generates epistemic injustices that mirror current hierarchies between global centres and peripheries of academic philosophy. In this sense, the emergence of analytic metaphysics of race may have contributed to a better understanding of racialization in the United States but has certainly not made substantial contributions to understanding racialization in global contexts such as Sudan (e.g. in the genocide in Darfur) to Indonesia (e.g. in the independence of Timor-Leste).
While the global variation of racialized practices makes some form of contextualism necessary, contextualism alone is not sufficient for addressing racial ontologies on a global scale. Let us define simple contextualism as a position that reduces the metaphysics of race to debates about contextualized entities such as race folk-contemporary-US . According to such a simple contextualism, there is no interesting debate about racial ontology beyond specific contexts because race does "not travel" between them.
This simple contextualist compartmentalization is inadequate because it fails to address the global nature of many racialization processes. For example, Root (2000, 631) is right to point out that a black man in the United States may not be counted as black in Brazil (see Muniz and Bastos 2017 ) but this does not mean that there are no meaningful continuities between these countries. Most obviously, racialization processes in Brazil and the United States are both the product of European settler colonialism and the transatlantic slave trade. Understanding these processes requires engagement with their transnational nature. Of course, there are also many meaningful differences in how racialization works in Brazil and the United States from affirmative action (Oliven 2007) to medical sciences (Chor and Lima 2005) . However, a discussion that only considers contextual variation without acknowledging the existence of global racialization processes will provide an incomplete metaphysical picture and at best a partial answer to the ontological question of what there is. At the very least, contextualized debates about localized processes that "do not travel" have to be supplemented with a globally informed debate that investigates how racialization processes "do travel" across cultural, linguistic, social, and political borders.
While analytic metaphysics of race has largely neglected issues of transnational continuity, the global character of racialization has been at the centre of other engagements with race in anti-colonial, black nationalist, and "Third World" Marxist traditions. One widely shared assumption in these traditions is that racialization is at its core a global process because it is grounded in an equally global system of colonization and white supremacy. Cruse's 1962 essay "Revolutionary Nationalism and the Afro-American" illustrates this line of argument by insisting that race in the United States is still colonial in nature: "From the beginning, the American Negro has existed as a colonial being. His enslavement coincided with the colonial expansion of European powers and was nothing more or less than a condition of domestic colonialism. Instead of the United States establishing a colonial empire in Africa, it brought the colonial system home and installed it in the Southern states" (2009, 76) . This idea of a "black colony" did not only allow Cruse to conceive race in the United States as a national expression of a global phenomenon but also became widely adopted by black nationalist movements of the 1960s including the Black Panther Party (e.g. 10 Point Program, §10) and the Revolutionary Action Movement (e.g. 12-Point Program, §9), which used the idea of racialization as colonization as the foundation of radical anti-colonial and internationalist politics.
While these anti-colonial and internationalist framings of race from the 1960s have lost much influence in racial discourse, critical race theory often continues to address race as a global phenomenon that is grounded in an equally global system of white supremacy. For example, Winant's The World is a Ghetto However, Winant also insists that this rupture has led to a transformation rather than disappearance of the "world racial system". Following Gramsci's ([ 1926] 2014) distinction between direct domination and cultural hegemony, Winant characterizes the world racial system as shifting from dominant to hegemonic "white supremacy [that] has proven itself capable of [...] repackaging itself as 'colorblind,' nonracialist, and 'meritocratic' (2004, xiii) ." While invisibility of oppression is a core feature of any system of hegemony that replaces the direct violence of systems of domination, the hegemonic character of the current racial system still almost universally enforces white supremacy: "Pick any relevant sociological indicator -life expectancy, infant mortality, literacy, access to health care, income levels -and apply it in virtually any setting, global, regional, or local, and the results will be the same: the worldwide correlation of wealth and well-being with white skin and European descent" (2001, 35) .
While Winant could hardly be more explicit in claiming ontological significance of his analysis for understanding race as a "socially constructed and politically contested" (2004, 39) category, the global character of white supremacy is rarely at the centre of debates about the nature and reality of race in analytic metaphysics. An important exception is Mills' version of social constructionism that addresses race as a reality that is created through "white supremacy as a sociopolitical system" (2003).
Mills not only emphasizes the global character of white supremacy but also its status as "a theoretical object in its own right -a global social system comparable in current significance [...] to Marx's class society and feminist thinkers ' patriarchy" (2003, 178) .
Given Mills' framing, a simple contextualism that ignores the transnational character of white supremacy would be as inadequate for understanding the nature of race as a metaphysics of class that ignores the global character of capitalism.
While there remains considerable room for disagreement about the exact role of global issues in racial ontologies , the internationalist tradition in critical race theory indicates that a simple contextualism, which is limited to relativized ontologies such as race folk-contemporary-US, will miss the transnational nature of many processes of racialization. As a result, it provides at best an incomplete framework for a globally engaged metaphysics of race and runs the risk of obscuring the global nature of racialization.
Unificationism and its Limitations
One may react to the limitations of contextualism by proposing a radically different strategy that aims for one globally unified ontology and provides transnational answers to questions about the nature and reality of race. This section presents two different ways of developing such a unificationism. First, one may propose unificationist ontologies on the basis of global "white supremacy" in the sense of the last section. Second, one may follow Hardimon (2017) (Berg and Wendt 2011, 2) but also become contrasted with alternative "interactionist" models that postulate multiple interacting systems of racialization (Bonnett 2017 ).
Dikötter's work on the emergence of racial discourses in modern China ([1998] 2015) has been groundbreaking in this regard as it reconstructs the formation of racialized In addition to this multiplicity of systems of racialization, the multiplicity of concepts of race provides a further reason for skepticism about global unification.
Even if a system of white supremacy exists across contexts, it may not always be the referent of local race concepts. For example, consider divergent developments of racial discourses in Germany and the United States after World War II. Even it is true that race in the United States is best understood as referring to a social kind that is the product of white supremacy, the same may not be true in post-Holocaust Germany where race is so strongly associated with debunked racialist Nazi ideology that claims about the social character and reality of race appear self-contradictory.
To illustrate this conceptual divergence, consider a policy paper of the Bundestag 1949) . The policy paper appeals to the German consensus about the non-existence of races in arguing for the elimination of this passage: "There seems to be awareness of the problems of the concept 'race' in Germany as well as a will to not use the concept anymore. Now is the time for the last step: the concept of race should not be used anymore in legal texts" (Cremer 2010, 6 , translation by author). Note that the paper does not deny the existence of white supremacy in Germany and is actually motivated by the goal of improving anti-racist practices. However, it insists that the German concept of race refers to racialist illusions rather than social realities.
Recent debates about Weisssein ("whiteness") in Germany provide further evidence that recognition of social realities of white supremacy does not presuppose an account of race in terms of these realities. For example, Amjahid's (2017) book
Unter Weissen ("Among Whites") dissects German practices of white supremacy but explicitly avoids realist appeals to Rasse by pointing out the "historical burden"
(2017, 49) of the concept. In this sense, the German concept of race may indeed be more adequately understood in analogy to other failed concepts such as witch . While alleged witches were forced in very real social positions, claims about the reality of races in Germany seem just as misleading as claims about the reality of witches. A
Unification Through a Minimalist Concept of Race.
While white supremacy forms the basis for one potential strategy of global unification, Hardimon (2017, 31 ) has recently proposed a very different unificationism and argued that "race is now a world concept par excellence. It is clear that there are different conceptions of race.
But it is plausible to assume that these different conceptions of race are articulations of one and the same concept". According to Hardimon, this global concept of race can be specified in terms of a "logical core" of three minimal biological requirements of (a) patterns of visible features, (b) common ancestry, (c) distinctive geographical ancestry.
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Unfortunately, Hardimon simply suggests the global applicability of his "logical core" without providing empirical evidence. In addition to this lack of positive evidence, the problems from 3.1 extend to Hardimon's brand of unificationism. First, a multiplicity of systems of racialization plausibly leads to a multiplicity of race concepts. For example, consider Hardimon's element (a) and his insistence on the necessity of actual patterns of visible features (2017, 34) . Even if we accept that visible phenotypic variation applies to racialized groups in the United States, it does not apply to Jews as the major racialized group in much of European history. This may be an acceptable consequence for race folk-contemporary-US but raises doubts about the three elements (a) -(c) as a basis for a globally extended "world concept" of race.
Second, transnational conceptual variation provides more direct evidence for the inadequacy of Hardimon's logical core in global perspective. For example,
Hardimon contrasts his core in the sense of (a) -(c) with racialist concepts of race that assume biological essences or normatively important differences. He argues that the ordinary concept of race is not racialist because "there is no contradiction in saying that Caucasians are a race but have no biological essences or that Sub-Saharan Africans are a race even though there is no normatively important feature common and peculiar to them" (2017, 29) . As the earlier discussion of racial discourses in post-Holocaust Germany illustrates, there are reasons to assume that saying these things is actually contradictory in Germany because the dominant concept of race in Germany is not Hardimon's minimalist concept. As Plümecke (2013, 12) summarizes racial discourses in Germany: "'Rasse' is the unword of the last 60 years, semantically entangled with the purity and destruction-oriented eugenic policy of the Nazis. Not even racist pamphlets [...] are allowed to contain this word" (translation by author).
Even more straightforward evidence for the inadequacy of Hardimon's "world concept" hypothesis can be found in German reception of American race discourses such as recent controversies about Reich's (2018) article "How Genetics Is
Changing Our Understanding of 'Race'" in the New York Times . An editorial of leading German researchers in the Süddeutsche Zeitung swiftly reacted to German reception of this controversy with a warning that "one should not confuse the American term 'race' with the German word 'Rasse'" (Lipphardt et al. 2018, translation by author). The authors doubt that "'race' means what German refers to as 'Rasse'" and point out that race-talk in the United States is far more normalized than in Germany: "Many people in the US are accustomed to using 'race' or 'ethnicity' to express their self-positioning in a community" (Lipphardt et al. 2018, translation by author). While this normalization makes Hardimon's assumption of a restricted logical core appealing in the American context, the continued dominance of racialist associations with "Rasse" makes the same analysis implausible in Germany.
To sum up, unificationist perspectives on global racial ontologies face at least two problems. First, there is the problem of multiple material systems of racialization. 
A Framework for Relating Racial Ontologies
While there are limitations to unificationist and contextualist accounts of racial ontologies, both perspectives also convey important insights. The challenge for a globally engaged metaphysics of race is to develop a framework that can integrate insights about transnational convergences and divergences. This section proposes a methodological reorientation in debates about racial ontologies that leads to a relational perspective and contrasts with simple contextualist and unificationist models. The following section discusses three case studies that show how this framework can generate novel insights in transnational perspective.
The basic methodological suggestion of this section is to reorient global debates about racial ontologies from a narrow focus on race concepts to a wider focus on race conceptions. The distinction between concepts and conceptions has been prominently used in Rawls' (1971) discussion of a widely shared concept of justice (roughly: equal rights and duties ) and his preferred conception ( justice as fairness ). More recently, Hardimon has employed this distinction to propose a metaphysics of race that focuses on "the logical core" of "the ordinary race concept stripped down to the barest bones" (2017, 28) . By approaching metaphysical questions about the nature and reality of race in terms of such a narrowly understood concept of race, Hardimon can defend an ontology of race in terms of his three "minimal conditions" (see section 3.2) without having to deny that a richer conception of race involves many other aspects from social hierarchies to false essentialist assumptions.
This restriction to a narrowly conceived core of the concept of race is not unique to Hardimon's proposal but widely shared in current metaphysics of race. For example, anti-realists typically do not deny that there are real biological and social differences associated with race but insist that false (e.g. essentialist and/or racialist) assumptions are at the non-negotiable core of the concept of race (Glasgow 2010) .
Furthermore, social constructionists do not deny that race is associated with biological differences or false assumptions but insist that race "in the core sense, is defined in terms of social relations" (Haslanger 2012, 185) . It is therefore not surprising that much of the metaphysics of race has focused on the priority of (e.g.
biological, cultural, social, racialist) features at the core of race .
A debate about racial ontologies in terms of a conceptual core "stripped down to the barest bones" comes with the virtue of simplicity as competing accounts characterize the nature of race in terms of one core property (e.g. being posited in a system of white supremacy) or a small set of core properties (e.g. Focusing on conceptions rather than concepts increases the complexity of analysis along three dimensions of (1) heterogenous conceptual connections, (2) material property relations, and (3) mappings between them. To illustrate these dimensions, consider two biological properties B1 and B2 such as South Asian ancestry and the sickle cell allele, two cultural properties C1 and C2 such as being Muslim or having a preference for Jazz music, two social properties S1 and S2 such as access to higher education and employment opportunities, and two properties D1
and D2 with debunked racialist associations such as innate tendency towards criminality and cognitive profiles. Focusing on conceptions rather than concepts of race allows an analysis of how these properties are conceptually and materially related across national contexts. 
Strong Continuities:
There will be also cases where conceptual connections remain (largely) stable across contexts. In the hypothetical scenario of figure   1 , the association of race with biological properties B1 and B2 is largely Choosing conceptions rather than concepts as a starting point therefore provides opportunities for fine-grained analyses of the strength of conceptual relations and their comparison across national contexts. In contrast, an analysis of narrow 5 concepts always runs the risk of obscuring either similarities (by proposing different conceptual cores) or differences (by proposing the same conceptual cores) across contexts.
In addition to such an analysis of heterogeneous conceptual connections, a shift towards conceptions also broadens the scope of relevant material property relations: For each of the properties from figure 1, one cannot only ask about conceptual but also material connections. Figure 2 illustrates this material aspect with the property of South Asian ancestry (B1). At least for present purposes, it will be sufficient to think of material property relations in terms of relative probabilities in a given context. Relative to context A, for example, having South Asian ancestry substantially increases the probability of being Muslim (C1), while moderately increasing the probability of having a sickle cell allele (B2), and not affecting the probability of innate cognitive profiles (D2).
the details will depend on wider philosophical commitments on issues such as semantic externalism.
For an internalist, it may be attractive to measure the strength of connections directly through experimental evidence of psychological associations or even questionnaires with a representative sample of informants for the given context. However, externalists may appeal to experts or more social science-oriented methods such as discourse analysis in determining how strongly features are associated with race . As the general case for an internationally engaged metaphysics of race should be acceptable for philosophers with different positions on these wider philosophical issues, I will not commit to one specific operationalization. Finally, analyses of conceptual connections and material property relations can be mapped onto each other to reveal both matching and mismatching patterns. In many cases, the continued impact of racialist ideologies will lead to mismatches such as associations with behavioral and cognitive differences that simply do not exist. In other cases, conceptual connections will match social realities such as racialized income differences. While most race conceptions involve both matches and mismatches, there can be considerable transnational variation in the way how conceptual connections map onto material relations. For example, the arguments from the last section suggest that German conceptions of race strongly emphasize mismatches through essentialist and racialist associations while recent developments of US discourses of race have led to stronger emphasis of socioeconomic realities in conceptions of race (Lipphardt et al. 2018 ).
To sum up, a shift from concepts to conceptions allows a more fine-grained comparison of transnational continuities and discontinuities of (1) heterogenous conceptual connections, (2) material property relations, and (3) mappings between them. Although such a framework provides opportunities for more fine-grained transnational comparison, it also shifts away from some highly visible issues in current metaphysics of race. Many recent metaphysical debates have focused on
whether races exist at all and whether they have a biological or social nature.
Approaching these questions through concepts allows the formulation of clear metaphysical alternatives such as anti-realism, biological realism, and social constructionism that appeal to competing hypotheses about the core of race concepts.
In contrast, a shift towards conceptions leads to more ambiguous and complex accounts that may not clearly favor one specific account of the nature and reality of race. Race conceptions will typically involve heterogenous associations that partly match (biological, cultural, and social) realities and partly fail to identify real property relations. Race conceptions as represented in figure 1 do therefore not provide straightforward answers to questions about the referent of race . In this sense, shifting the focus from concepts to conceptions does not lead to traditional metaphysical positions from anti-realism to biological realism but complements deflationist perspectives as expressed in my earlier critique of the "new metaphysics of race" (Ludwig 2015 (Ludwig , 2014 that was based on the assumption that race "is too ambiguous and vague to support a general metaphysical debate about the question whether human races exist" (2015, 258).
Of course, the proposed framework does not require such a general deflationism about traditional metaphysical projects as one could also combine the proposed account of conceptions with debates about the concept of race and its referent. While such a combination avoids some of the problems of an exclusive focus on race concepts, there are also reasons to circumvent the issue of conceptual cores in a globally oriented metaphysics of race. As the case studies of the next section will argue in further detail, attempts to isolate a conceptual core can mislead transnational comparisons by either overemphasizing similarities (by postulating the same core) or differences (by postulating different cores) between racial ontologies.
At least for the purposes of a globally engaged metaphysics of race, it therefore often seems more adequate to move away from race concepts and to focus on conceptions that provide more complex but admittedly also more ambiguous answers to questions about the nature and reality of race.
fine-grained analysis of race conceptions and their mapping onto material property relations.
The Relational Framework in Practice
The last section introduced a relational perspective on racial ontologies that builds on an analysis of conceptions rather than concepts. This section specifies the framework and its advantages in the context of three applied challenges of a globally engaged metaphysics of race: (5.1) Addressing partial continuities in transnational perspective, (5.2) understanding the entanglement of ethnicity and race, (5.3)
addressing global boundary disputes about race. For each of these challenges, it is argued that a narrow focus on concepts leads to overly simple answers while a discussion of conceptions allows to adequately relate racial ontologies. One of the differences that is most obvious that I see is that there are so many more of us in the United States of America, that as African American women we have had a history of recognition of each other, from slavery on, and therefore we have a pool to draw from. I think the Afro-German women have existed in a terrible isolation from each other [...] . We need to see, and we do, that our oppressor is the same with very different faces" (2004, (169) (170) .
African-American and
A comparative metaphysics of race in Germany and the United States that is based on a narrow focus on race concepts will neglect either the similarities or differences depending on whether the "logical core" is assumed to be stable between While such divergences may have put different aspects at the core of race concepts, racialization processes remain (conceptually and materially) connected from the use of phenotypic markers to social stratification along racial lines. Addressing this situation through a relational framework in the sense of figure 1 and 3 puts philosophers in the position to contribute to a better understanding of these complex situations that involve substantive discontinuities (e.g. resources for black identities) and continuities (e.g. shared experience of oppression). (Leal 2010) , Ecuador (Clark 2007) , Mexico (Ruiz 2001) and Peru ( Even if these socio-cultural aspects are of crucial importance in Latin American contexts, it would be a mistake to conceive the distinction between indígena and mestizo as purely cultural and free of biologization (Castañeda 2016 (Dikötter 2015; Law 2012; Wang et al. 2003) . Indeed, it is uncontroversial that prejudice and discrimination have been common in China both in historical relations to border communities and current attitudes towards minorities such as Tibetans and Uighurs. What is controversial, however, is whether these groups should be conceptualized as racial (rather than "merely" ethnic) and as victims of racism (rather than "merely" ethnic discrimination).
Indígena and
If metaphysics of race is approached through narrow core concepts, even slight variation at the core will lead to drastically different demarcations in these kinds of boundary disputes. Maybe the most telling examples are the radically different implications of different variants of social constructionism. Consider
Haslanger's influential account of race in terms of "observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of ancestral links to a certain geographical region" (2012, 236) . Such a definition applies rather straightforwardly to Tibetans and Uighurs in China and therefore seems to identify them as racial groups. More generally, Haslanger's account suggests a highly inclusive strategy in boundary disputes that affirms the existence of races in countless contexts that are historically and geographically independent of European modernity (Hochman 2017) . In contrast, recall earlier discussions of race in terms of a sociopolitical system of white supremacy. Given such an account, Tibetans and Uighurs are not racial groups because their discrimination is not grounded in this particular sociopolitical system.
More generally, this variant of social constructionism seems to imply a highly exclusive strategy in global boundary disputes about forms of discrimination and violence that are not specifically grounded in European colonial orders.
While it is possible to defend highly inclusive or exclusive accounts in boundary disputes, there is a risk of metaphysicians providing simplistic answers that fall behind the state of "interactionist" models (Dikötter 2015; Bonnett 2017) in the empirical literature that aim to understand the emergence of racial orders through the entanglement of elements with different historical and geographical origins.
Embracing a relational framework puts philosophers in a position to contribute to substantial analyses of nuanced connections rather than postulating overly simple demarcation criteria that decide at what point a group "really" counts as a racial group.
Conclusion
The aims of this article have been both critical and constructive. On the one hand, I
argued that simple contextualist and unificationist models are insufficient for understanding race on a global scale. On the other hand, I outlined a positive proposal for globally engaged metaphysics of race that shifts attention from concepts to conceptions. I have argued that this shift leads to a relational perspective on racial ontologies in terms of transnationally related but nonetheless distinct conceptions and their mappings onto property relations. Finally, I have sketched some benefits of this relational perspective for engaging with (5.1) partial continuities of racialization practices, (5.2) entanglements of ethnicity and race, (5.3) and global boundary disputes about race. These benefits also illustrate a larger opportunity for integrating relational accounts of the nature and reality of race with empirical research in ethnic and racial studies. It does not only allow philosophers to engage more adequately with complex empirical evidence but also provides social scientists with novel resources for analyzing and organizing this complexity.
